299 __ $aLogic and dialectics : confrontations, connexions, clarifications
955 __ $a1
200 __ $aLogic and dialectics $econfrontations, connexions, clarifications $fPetru Ioan $gtranslations from the Romanian: Carmen Manoliu-Ciobanu, Silvia Manoliu $geditor: Sorin Pârvu $bCarte tipărită
700 __ $aIOAN, PETRU
702 __ $4traducător $aManoliu-Ciobanu, Carmen
702 __ $4traducător $aManoliu, Silvia
702 __ $4editor $aPârvu, Sorin
035 __ $a16/I-61
675 __ $a16
675 __ $a162.6
686 __ $a1
606 __ $aLogică (concepţii)
606 __ $aDialectică (logică)
101 __ $aeng
102 __ $aRomania
210 __ $aIași $c"Al. I. Cuza" University Press $d1990
215 __ $a264 p. $cfig., tab.
225 __ $aInterferences
300 __ $aBibliogr. p. 262-264
300 __ $aEx libris nostris: Fundaţia Internaţională "Ştefan Lupaşcu" Iaşi
330 __ $aCONTENTS confrontations 9 1.IMPLICATION AND CONDITIONING AS CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE “SEMANTIC DRAWBACK" IN FORMAL ANALYSES 11 1.1.the paradoxes of implication (12) ; 1.2. the implication and the counterfactual statements (17) ; 1.3. arguments towards the demystification of material implication (22) ; 1.4. thé ambiguity of the conditional conjunction if and the system of gradual implications (26) ; 1.5. reconsidering the topics at issue (30) 2.LOGIC AND THE PARADOXES OF COMMITMENT 33 2.1.the paradoxes of the ’’old system” of deontic logic: antecedents, explanations and reduplications (35) ; 2.2. outcomes of explanations through concept ambiguousness and the confusion of the levels of non-theoretical discourse,(44) ; 2.3. the relativization of deontic modalities and the chances of a new solution in the matter of paradoxes (46); 2.4. the ’’dictive indifference” principle of formal logic and the temptations of ’’assertoric reductibility” (51) ; 2.5. the semantically reoriented problem (55) ; 2.6. the semantico-pragmatic drawback and the dissipation of paradoxes (60) 3.THE ’’SOLUTION” TO THE PARADOXES OF SELF-REFERENCE IN VIEW OF AN INTEGRATING MODEL67 3.1: the thesis that paradoxes originate in misconstructed phrases and its methodological conversion in the context, of logical syntax (67); 3.2. the meaning and value of the test of syntactic correctedness (71); 3.3. the uses of semantics in neutralising self-referential structures by distinguishing between language levels (76) ; 3.4. the relevance of logical pragmatics in the matter of self-reference (82) ; 3.5. the conclusions of a bird’s eye view of the discussion on self-reference (84) 4.PARADOXES OF THE LOGICAL SYMMETRY 87 4.1. arguments against symmetry (87); logical contexts of symmetry (90); the dialectical partition between symmetry and dissymmetry in the field of formal logic reconciliation of doctrines over logical symmetry (95) connexions 99 5 LOGIC - A SCIENCE OF CREATION ?101 5.1.the risk of promoting a ’’science of creation” (101); 5.2. logic is an open science on the move (102); 5.3. logic, on the whole, is a ’’heuristical science” (104); 5.4. even traditional logic is opposed to ’’rhapsody” (105) ; 5.5. constructive methods in syllogistics (107) ; 5.6. heuristical algorythms in molecular logic (111); 5.7. the answer to the initial question (114) 6. DEVELOPMENTS OF LOGIC IN CONNECTION WITH THE DIFFERENTIATION OF RATIONALITY MODES 115 6.1.dissociations between rationality, scientificality and logicality (115); 6.2. modes of cognition in relation with modes of rationality (116); 6.3. correlations between logical formalisms, types of rationality and modes of discourse (119); 6.4. logic as unity in diversity (121) 7.LOGIC AND. DIALECTICS 124 7.1.dialectics - a generic concept (125) ; 7.2. logic : the open work (127) ; 7.3. the relation of logic to dialectics or how one can possibly close what is opened (129) ; 7.4. the programme of an a-dialectical philosophy, neutral in relation with logic (132); 7.5. logic without dialectics (135); 7.6. dialectics without logic (136); 7.7. both logic and dialectics (138); 7.7.1. logical dialectics (139); 7.7.2. the logic of dialectics (141); 7.7.3. dialectical logic (143); 7.7.4. the dialectics of logic (149); 7.8. a dialectical exit from the discussion on the relation between logic and dialectics (151) 8.PRELIMINARIES TO A PROGRAMME OF INTEGRAL LOGIC154 8.1.the parallelism of the fundamental categories of logic (157); 8.2.the parallelism of the relations between the basic logical categories (161) ; 8.3. constructive operations on basic logical categories (165); 8.4. references of textual logic (171) 9.OUTLINES OF A LOGICO-LINGUISTIC MODEL OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 173 9.1.drawbacks of traditional grammar analysis (173);9.2. restricting the functions of grammatical subordination (174); 9.3. the extension of the roles of coordination (176); 9.4. the profits of the logico-linguistic analysis (179) clarifications 183 10.THE FORMAL NORMS OF TRUTH, SOME CONTRIBUTIONS TO A GENERAL THEORY OF LOGICAL RELATIONS TAKEN AS PRINCIPLES '185 10.1.principles and values in deontic logic (185); the condition of principles in ’’theoretical” formal logic (187) ; 10.3. fundamental types of logical relations (188) ; 10.4. the parallelism between principles and relationships (189) ; 10.5. distinct epistemic levels of logical prescriptions (190) ; 10.6. ontologies and value criteria, afferent to the system of logical principles and relationships (192) ; 10.7. some conclusions (193) 11.ACQUISITIONS OF THE SEMIOTIC MODEL IN THE RECUPERATION OF THE LEVELS OF TRUTH 190 11.1.the ambiguity position of Tarski’s semantic criterion and of its critique (199); 11.2. the compromise Bunge tried to make : a synthetic conception of truth through interpropositional agreement and factual reference (201); 11.3. the parallel which Rescher drew between the two rival outlooks, that of coherence and that of correspondence (202);11.4.a dilemma which persists: shall we speak of criteria of truth or of truth as one of the criteria of knowledge? (203) ; 11.5. the semiotic model : the widest frame for the ratification of knowledge criteria (206); 11.6. consistency, coherence, reductibility, demonstrability, syntactic criteria in evaluating knowledge (208); 11.7. on decidability, interpretation or representation and satisfaction in the model, as semantic criteria (209); 11.8. consensus, credibility and acceptability, pragmatic marks of the knowledge expressed in statements (212); 11.9. in lieu of conclusions (2-16) 12.LOGICAL TRUTH AND THE SUPPOSITION OF EXISTENCE 219 12.1.on a general criterion of ontological assumption (219); 12.2. the semantic failure of the syllogistics with quasi-existential universals (223); 12.3. the ontological inadequacy of syllogistics with quasi-existential particulars (230); 12.4. other succedanea in the ontological control of syllogistic formalisms (234); 12.5. the answer to the question (236); 12.6. retrospection and conclusions (241) 13. DUALIZING AS A METALOGICAL PRINCIPLE OF A GENERAL VALUE 246 13.1.notes on a preliminary definition (246); 13.2. are there incongruities between the fields of duality ? (249); 13.3.'dualizing the functions of functions (252) ; 13.4. theorems pointing out the efficiency of the count equalization principle (255) ; 13.5 landmarks beyond the analysis (259) THE AUTHOR’S SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 262